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R E M A, H K S 



OF 



HENET J. RAYMOND, 

SPEAKER OF THE ASSEMBLY, 



ON THiBJ 



Conduct of our Foreign Affairs and the Action and Disposition 
of European Powers. 

In Assembly, State of New York, Mar. 5, 1862. 



ALBANY : 
WEED, PARSONS AND COMPANY, PRINTERS. 

1862. 



H E M A. H K S 



In Committee of the Whole, on Wednesday evening, March 5, the Bill providing 
for an appropriation of five millions of dollars, and the raising, arming and equip- 
in o- of one hundred thousand men, to protect the frontiers of the State of New 
York against invasion, coming up for discussion, 

Mr. Raymond, of New York City, spoke substantially as follows : ( 

and at all times, adequate and full preparation 
for every probable emergency of the future. 

I concedo that the remarks already made upon 
this subject, the facts brought to the knowledge 
of the House, especially in the able speech of 
the gentleman from Ulster (Mr. Pierce), as well 
as in the further remarks of the gentlemen from 
St. Lawrence and Clinton, do establish this point, 
that our country is not adequately provided for 
defence. I think no one can claim, in the light 
of the information submitted to this committee, 
that we are fully prepared for the possible, or 
even for the probable, emergencies that the future 
has in store for us. I think, therefore, that this 
defect should be remedied, promptly and eflfec- 
tually. Our frontier should be put in a position 
of perfect and complete defence ; and the Gene- 
ral Government should do it. The duty is expli- 
citly devolved upon the General Government by 
the Constitution to raise and support armies, to 
suppress insurrection, to maintain a navy, to re- 
pel invasion, and to make all preparations that 
may tend to make its action in war effective. It ;■ 
is, therefore, the duty of the General Govern- 
ment to put the northern frontier of the United 
States in a" state of defence ; not alone the fron- 
tier of New York, but that of the entire Repub- 
lic. The General Government should make these 
defences sufficient to meet all the probable emer- 
gencies of the immediate future ; and I am happy 
to be able to say that the government of the 
United States has taken the preliminary steps ,i 



Mr. Chairman: I desire to make some remarks 
upon the bill before the committee. I do not know 
whether I can promise that those remarks shall 
be brief, or very rigidly confined to the specific 
provisions of the act under discussion ; for the 
debate has taken a very wide range, though not 
wider, perhaps, than the suggestions, if not the 
provisions, of the bill itself would warrant. The 
title of the bill,— " An Act to provide for the 
public defence/' — is one which of itself com 
mends the bill very strongly to the loyalty and 
patriotism of every member of this House; and 
if any member shall be led to oppose it, I am 
C3rtain that the reason for such hostility will 
not be found ia the general objects which that 
biP presents, but in some of the specific provi- 
sions by which those objects are to be attained. 
Most surely, sir, I am one of the first and fore- 
most, and trust I always shall be so, not only to 
concede, but to claim, that our country shall be 
at all times in a position for adequate defence 
against foes, foreign or domestic. There is no 
maxim that has been more honored, or is more 
worthy of honor, than this, that — "In time of 
peace we must prepare for war." We must have 
fortifications and troops, — munitions of war, — 
an organized army, and a sufficient navy ; and 
if at any time we are deficient in these prepara- 
tions for national defence, it becomes us at once, 
without hesitation, to remedy that deficiency. 
Whatever of this sort, however, is required, 
should not be done in so ostentatious a manner 
as to invite hostility or seem like menace; nor 
should it be so done as to impose excessive bur- 
dens upon the People for whose protection it is 
designed. But we should have, in every case, 



towards this end, and is engaged in preparing a - 
bill embodying the necessary appropriations. In 
addition to what is known from other sources, 
accessible to the public at large, it may not be 



improper for me to state that I saw to-day an 
influential member of the Committee of Ways 
and Means in the House of Representatives, and 
he told me that a bill was nearly ready and would 
soon be presented for the consideration of Con- 
gress, and be pressed through with all possible 
dispatch, which provides for prompt and effec- 
tive action on the part of the General Govern- 
ment in regard to frontier defences. If they 
seem to us, however, likely to be negligent or dil- 
atory in making these provisions, then it is our 
privilege, and even our duty, to urge upon them 
the importance of speedy action, and to insist 
that they shall neglect it no longer. It is for us 
to address them, not only concerning the wants 
of our own state — though upon that point we 
may speak with authority — but we may call up- 
( on them to put the entire Republic in a position 
J of defence and preparation against whatever con- 
• tingencies may threaten us ; and furthermore, it 
is our duty to give them, in this undertaking, 
all the aid they may require, in money or in 
credit, to the extent of our ability. This we 
should do : and especially where the specific inte- 
rests of our own state require it, should we do it 
\ promptly and without hesitation. 

But this is not all which this bill proposes. 
If I understand its provisions, it goes much far- 
ther than this. As originally reported by the 
Committee on Militia and Public Defence, it pro- 
vides that the State of New York shall proceed 
forthwith to arm herself, — to put herself, as a 
State, in an attitude and position of defence 
against invasion, — that she shall build forts 
upon her frontiers and arm them, — that she 
shall forthwith enrol and discipline an army of 
a hundred thousand men, and purchase a hun- 
dred thousand stand of arms, by way of prepa- 
ration for the contingency of war. In a word, 
Sir, the bill provides that the Sta^e of New York 
shall act in this matter substantially as if she 
were an independent, sovereign nation, — clothed 
with power to declare and make war, and thrown 
upon her own resources for defence in the event 
of war. That is the spirit of the bill. That is 
the legitimate character and tendency of its pro- 
visions. True, it contains provisions looking 
^toward co-operation with the General Govern- 
ment ; but the lead is still left, with the State,— 
the general drift of the bill is in the direction I 
have indicated. Indeed, the bill looks very 
much as if it had been framed with reference, 

I 



more or less direct, to the possible contingency 
that the State of New York might find herself 
under the necessity, or might be tempted into 
the policy, of proclaiming her independence of 
the Union, and of standing aloof from her sister 
states, I could not help, when I first read this 
bill, recalling some very ominous sentences 
which had fallen from the lips of gentlemen, 
not in this hall alone, but elsewhere also, con- 
cerning what it might become the duty of this 
State to do in case we should fail to suppress 
the rebellion now raging against the General 
Government. I have never heard such remarks 
without the deepest regret, — for I have never al- 
lowed myself to believe, or for an instant to 
concede, that it could, in any emergency, be- 
come necessary for the State of New York to 
think of independence or of making, to use 
language held on this floor at the outset of the 
session, such arrangements for herself alone as 
circumstances might require. I will not permit 
myself under any emergency which can now be 
deemed probable to contemplate such a contin- 
gency as that. I shall oppose everything that 
looks towards it, for I can conceive of nothing 
more hostile to the spirit which should animate 
us, — nothing more hostile to the true welfare of 
the country, than the sentiment that underlies 
such admissions, however unconsciously to those 
who make them. I oppose everything that tends, 
directly or remotely, to weaken the spirit or the 
sentiment of nationality in any State of this 
Union, — most of all in our own State. I see 
more and mere clearly every day ihat it is this 
sentiment alone, — the sentiment of a common 
Constitution, a common Union, one common 
bond of loyalty, and one common basis for 
national honor and renown, — that can cany u? 
safely through the perils which now surround 
us. I cling to this sentiment, more and more, 
the more it is imperiled. [Applause.] We have 
had some severe lessons upon this subjpct, — 
lessons which should teach us wisdom. It is no 
time unduly to exalt state rights and state sov- 
ereignty now ; least of all in this section of the 
Union. The great trouble of our nation to- 
day comes from this very source, the attempt 
of individual states to assume for themselves 
the sovereign right to act independently of 
the general government which includes th^m 
all, and gives them all their real glory. The 
doctrine of state rights — distorted from its 



real meaning and raised to a position of hostility 
to the Union, lies at the basis of the conspiracy 
which has plunged us into this disastrous war. 
It is, indeed, the very egg out of which this re- 
bellion has been hatched. 

While, therefore, I desire as ardently as any man 
to see New York put in a position of defence, I de- 
sire it for her as one of the United States. I do not 
desire it for her as having an interest in this parti- 
cular separate from that of Vermont, or Maine, or 
Michigan, or any of the other States that are 
equally exposed. Whatever is done for the de- 
fence of one State, should be done for the defence 
of all. It is our interest as a nation and not as 
a state that is here to be protected, and therefore 
I look to the general government for that pro- 
tection. I would call upon that government to 
do whatever may be necessary under existing 
emergencies, and proffer to that government 
whatever aid she may require. 

This, I think it will be conceded by all who 
hear me, is the correct doctrine upon this sub- 
ject. As a general rule, it is not for individual 
states to fortify their own frontiers against in- 
vasion. But it is said, on the other side, that 
this rule, however sound, may and must be 
waived in the presence of great emergencies — 
that under such overruling emergencies, we may 
lose sight, for the time being, of those relations 
which ordinarily limit our action as a state — that 
when we are involved in special peril, we may 
decide for ourselves and act independently of the 
General Government. The law of self-preserva- 
tion, it is said, requires this, and the Constitution 
expressly permits it. 

Now I am willing, at least for the sake of the 
argument, to concede this. Indeed, I believe it 
to be substantially true. Bat gentlemen who 
urge this as a reason for passing this bill, 
will perceive that it throws upon them the en- 
tire burden of proving the emergency. It must 
be no conjectural emergency — no peril based on 
general considerations of possible or even proba- 
ble events in the indefinite future. It must be an 
impending peril — one which stares us fully and 
unmistakably in the face — one so palpable and so 
great as to admit of no delay, •' In case of in- 
vasion," our state Constitution authorizes us to 
borrow money to meet the danger; but it most 
be an invasion — not actually upon our soil, I ad- 
mit — but foreseen, foreknown ; not merely con- 
jectured as probable or feared as possible. And 
the burden of proving affirmatively the existence 



of such an impending peril as this, devolves upon 
those who base upon it their advocacy and sup- 
port of this bill. Gentlemen have recognized this 
obligation by endeavoring to fulfill it. They have 
endeavored to prove that this peril is impend- 
ing, — that this emergency is really upon us,— 
nor merely that there is reason to believe that 
we may be at war with some foreign power^ 
which would be all that is necessary to decide 
the action of the general government, but that 
we are in such certain danger of immediate or 
very near invasion, as to require the State to ex- 
pend five millions of dollars in fortifying her 
frontiers and in putting her militia upon a war 
footing. The gentleman from Ulster, Chairman i 
of the Committee on Public Defence (Mr. Pierce), , 
took this ground very distinctly and pressed it 
with great force. The gentleman from St. 
Lawrence (Mr. Hulburd), took the same ground 
and pushed it still further. He read to the com- 
mittee elaborate statements in detail of the » 
condition of the several forts which guard New 
York haibor, — dwelling upon the fact that i 
many of them had not cartridges enough to fire i 
a dozen rounds, and holding forth the idea, even 
if he did not express it in words, that war was J 
so imminent, that invasion was so close at hand, 
that we should not have time even to replenish 
our magazines and cartridge boxes before it ; 
would be upon us. The gentleman from Clinton 
(Mr. Stetson) took the same ground, and carried 
the idea that even before this bill could pass, 
there was danger of invasion from our northern 
neighbors. 

Mr. Stetson. — I did not state any such thing, 
nor did I intend to convey any such idea. 

Mr, Raymond, — I spoke, I confess, rather of! 
the general drift of the gentleman's remarks 
than of any specific language which he em- 
ployed. If the intention is disclaimed, I certain- 
ly accept it and owe the gentleman an apology, , 

Mr. Stetson. — I simply drew a parallel be- 
tween "what might be the state of things, as 1 1 
viewed it in case of an invasion in the present I 
condition, and the state of things supposed, in 
such an event, by the gentleman from Onondaga. 
I had no such thought or apprehension in my i 
mind as the gentleman from New York imputes^ 
to me. [Other gentlemen, referred to, made sim- 
ilar disclaimers in their seats, saying that they i 
had not intended to represent the danger of in- 
vasion, as imminent,] 



Mr. Raymond. — Well, then, if gentlemen real- 
ly believe that there is no such impending dan- 
ger, that there is no such imminent emergency, 
they abandon the only ground on which this 
j bill can possibly be defended. [Applause and 
I laughter.] I can not think that they intend 
thus at the very outset to throw it overboard, 
after all the arguments and rhetoric they have 
expended in its support. I certainly can not bo 
, mistaken in saying that the leading object of 
! every member who has spoken in defence of this 
' bill, has been to show that we were in imminent 
danger of a war with England, and that this 
danger was so great as not only to justify, but 
require this State to arm herself instantly for 
defence, without awaiting the action of the fed- 
' eral government. That, I am sure, will not be 
denied or disavowed ; and I proceed, therefore, to 
inquire whether gentlemen have succeeded in es- 
tablishing that point. Have they demonstrated 
the existence of such an emergency^ Have 
they shown that war between the United States 
and Great Britain is so certain, so imminent, as 
i to demand that the State of New York should 
take the steps proposed in this bill "? 

If we are to have war with Great Britain, sir, 
that war must arise from one of these three facts : 
( 1. ) Either there is some open, unsettled con- 
troversy between the two nations which diplo- 
macy can not adjust, in which arbitration will 
not be accepted, and which can only be settled 
by an appeal to arms ; — or, 

( 2. ) England must intend speedily to declare 
war against us ; — or, 

( 3. ) We must intend speedily to declare war 
against her. Unless war arises from one of these 
causes, — unless there is reason to believe that it 
will arise speedily, immediately, instantly al- 
most, from one of these three causes, the exist- 
ence of the alleged emergency is not proved. 
The case is not nmde out. Now, how is it 1 Let 
me examine each point in its proper order. 

I. Is there any unsettled dispute pending between 
the two countries ? If so, will any gentleman be 
jgood enough to name it? Have not all our dif- 
rfrtrences been so far adjusted as to remove them 
Ifrom the contending diplomacy of the twocoun- 
Jtries ? Have they not been settled amicably, and 
fwore or less satisfactorily to both sides 7 Gen- 
tlemen say, that in all of these settlements. 
Great Britain has gained the advantage over us. 
[ am not disposed to concede this, for I do not 
believe the American statesmen who have nego- 



tiated these treaties, to be so far inferior to the 
English diplomatists engaged, in ability or in 
patriotism, as always to have been worsted in the 
encounter. I believe that in all our diplomacy 
we have fully held our own. And I am 
confirmed in this belief by the fact that 
precisely the same complaints are made on the 
other side. In Parliament, regularly at every ses- 
sion, the charge is brought forward that England 
has been cheated of her rights by the American 
diplomatists, or that she has been forced to 
yield to the arrogance of American pretensions. 
You remember the famous fiction of the red-line 
map by which, it is contended even to this day 
in England, the Americans deceived the English 
into the abandonment of a portion of their Maine 
frontier. Now these complaints on each side 
against the other carry with them a very strong 
presumption that both are without any just 
foundation, or else that loth have just enough 
of truth in them to nullify each other. 

But whatever the facts may be in this regard, 
the treaties are signed and ratified, and they have 
removed wholly from the arena of national con- 
troversy, the difierences to which they relate. 
Whether the advantage be on one side or the 
other, there is in that fact not the slightest occa- 
sion or pretext for war. Even if the reciprocity 
treaty with Canada be so wholly one-sided, so 
exclusively for the benefit of Canada, as my 
friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. Redington) de- 
scribes it, which, however, I do not think to be 
really the case, he will not pretend for a moment 
that it affords the slightest ground for war, or 
that it justifies the least apprehension that it 
may give rise to war. There is no " emergency " 
in that treaty, whatever relative advantages it 
may confer upon us or our neighbors. The 
Trent affair — the latest and most formidable of 
the difSculties which have threatened to disturb 
our peace— is also settled, upon terms which I 
need not criticise now, though I shall have occa- 
sion to do so at a subsequent stage of these re- 
marks, if the patience of the committee holds 
out — but which have at least closed the contro- 
versy and put an end to what was then truly an 
impending peril. I think. Sir, that no gentle- 
man will question the truth of the remark when 
I say, that so far as controverted claims are con- 
cerned, our diplomatic record with Great Britain 
is clearer, more free from sources of immediate 
collision than it has been for many years. 



But it is said England may break our block- 
ade. True : and when she does, then we shall be 
in danger of war. But she has not done it yet. 
She does not even threaten to do it ; nor can I 
find in her official acts and declarations, any evi- 
dence or indication of an intention to break it. 
Nay, sir, all the evidence that is accessible to us, 
(for the correspondence has not yet been pub- 
lished,) points directly the other way. It shows 
that she has steadily resisted all attempts to in- 
duce her to break it, either by her own distressed 
people or by emissaries of the rebel states. She 
has refused to yield to any pressure, and has de- 
clared her purpose to respect the blockade so 
loi.'g as it is effectively maintained ; and that is all 
we have any right to ask of her. You will re- 
member that when at the close of last Novem- 
ber, Mr. Yaxcey and his colleagues represented 
to Earl Russell that, for strong reasons of justice 
and of interest, England should not tolerate the 
blockade, he was met by the refusal to hold offi- 
cial intercourse with him on any subject what- 
ever. You remember that when a deputation of 
the Liverpool ship-owners waited upon Earl 
Russell, urging the injury which the blockade 
was inflicting upon British commerce, as a reason 
why it should no longer be respected, they were 
met by the refusal to consider such a reason as 
entitled to a moment's weight against the re- 
quirements of justice and international law. You 
will remember, too, that when within a very 
few weeks, Mr. Mason stated to Lord Russell 
that more than 600 vessels had run the blockade, 
and that this fact furnished conclusive evidence 
that it was not effectively maintained, and was 
not therefore entitled to be respected, he was 
asked to give the size and tonnage of the ves- 
sels, and when he confessed his inability to do 
this he was told that this was a most important 
circumstance, as the great majority of these 
vessels might have been mere shallops that could 
pass from one port to another through the creeks 
and small arms of the sea, and were not restric- 
ted by the blockade at all. And, when still more 
recently, a member called on the British govern- 
ment to lay upon the table the names of all the 
British vessels that had broken the blockade, 
with a view to found upon this return a motion 
that the blockade be disregarded, ho was met 
by the refusal of the government to give the 
names of its own subjects who had violated the 
laws of a friendly power, or to permit their mis- 



conduct to be made the basis of imperial action, 
I do not cite these instances to show that England 
has pursued a course intentionally friendly to us 
in thi^contest, — but to prove, as in my judgment 
they do prove, a disposition and a determination 
on her part, not to break the blockade so long 
as it is maintained effectively, in conformity 
with the requirements of international law. We 
have no right to ask or expect England or any 
other nation to do more than this. We, of all 
nations in the world, cannot possibly assert the 
validity of a paper blockade. From the very 
beginning of our history to the present day, we 
have held that a blockade must be effective, — 
must be maintained by an effective and adequate ; 
force, in order to be entitled to respect. 

But it is said again, England threatens to; 
recognize the Southern Confederacy. Well, — if! 
she should do that, as well as threaten it, wan 
would be imminent. It might be imminent 
enough to justify the passage of this bill. ButI 
it is only fair to remember that she has not donet 
it, — that she has not even threatened to do it, 
but that on the contrary, she has refused,, 
steadily and firmly, to make any such acknow- 
ledgment. She has thus far adhered to the set- 
tled rule of international law, that no nation is en- 
titled to the recognition of her independencet 
until it has been de facto established, and until 
she has proved, by actual success, her ability tot 
maintain it. This is the rule for us and for all 
nations. England has declared her purpose in 
this instance to abide by it, and thus far she 
has done so. And furthermore, sir, up to the^ 
present time, she has declared that the Southern 
Confederacy has not fulfilled this condition of 
her recognition. In his reply of August 24, to 
the long and elaborate argument made by the 
rebel emissaries in favor of recognition, Lord 
Russell met the whole question by the decisive 
declaration, that 

" Her Majesty icill strictly perform the duties ichich be-'' 
long to a neutral. Her Majesty cannot undertake toi; 
determine by anticipation what may be the issue of 
the coiileft, nor can she acknowledge the independence of 
the nine States ichich are noio combined against the Pres- 
ident of the United Slates until the fortune ufarinsor' 
the more peaceful mode of negotiation shall have more [ 
clearly determined the respective positions of the two bel- 
ligerents.^'' 

And this has been repeated by the government 
even down to the present time, in the face of thi 
disaster of Bull Run, and in spite of the pro-- 
tracted and wearisome inactivity of our ownl 
armies. And what is quite as much to the pur- 
pose and even more important, the leader of the^ 



opposition in the House of Lords, the Earl of 
Derby, who would naturally sympathize with 
those who suffer from and censure the action of 
the government, has still more recently made a 
similar declaration. I see by the New York 
Times of this morning that when he rose, only a 
fortnight since, to correct an erroneous report of 
remarks he had made on a previous occasion, he 
used ihis language: 

" I am represented as having said nearly the opposite 
of what I staled in reference to the recognition of the 
Southern Suites. The report is that *I thuili the lime 
has nearly come when the Government may probably be 
called on to recognize the so fiir successful revolt of the 
seceded States ' W/iat I said icas that the time has not 
come ichen it can properly be called on to recognize the 
Government representi/ig the successful revolt of the 
Soulhern States. I added that, though it is the practice 
to reCDgiiiz-j a de facto Government that has succeeded 
n establishing itr-elf, I did not think that the resistance 
of the Southern States had been so successful as to juslify 
us in recognizing them as a Powsr able to maintain itfi 
otcn independence.^'' 

And this was said, sir, before news of the re- 
cent victories of the Union armies had reached 
England, and when there was much in the state 
of things here, as a distant observer might view 
it, to encourage the belief that the southern 
rebellion could not be subdued. Neither the 
Sari Russell nor Lord Derby knew anything of 
'Jie rout of the rebels at Roanoke island, or of 
.he fall of Fort Henry, the conquest of Foit 
Oonelson by storm,' and the capture of 15,000 
rebel prisoners, the surrender of Nashville, the 
evacuation of Columbus, or any of the glorious 
incidents which have so electrified the heart of 
ihe nation, and left England and the world still 
tess excuse for believing in the fact or the pro- 
bability of southern independence. If they 
iook this ground then, is it not much more cer- 
tain that they will adhere to it now ? 

Now, Mr, Chairman, I think I have shown 

,hat there is no probability of war with Great 

Britain growing out of any disi ute now pending 

Detween the two powers, — nor from any action 

vhich the British Government has taken or is 

iteely to take in regard to breaking the block- 

ide or recognizing the Southern Confederacy. 

can find in none of these matters any proof, or 

ndication even, of such an emergency as would 

ustify the State of New York in arming herself 

gainst impending peril. Is there any other 

,( (uestion of a threatening character on which 

I )ie two nations are at issue 1 If there is I 

^.Jliould feel obliged to any gentleman who will 

lame it, — here and now, — for I desire to exam- 

ne this whole case, and to do it fully and can- 

lidly as I go along. 



Mr. Ogden : I would like to ask the gentle- 
man from New York, if it will not be an inter- 
ruption, whether a question may not arise out of 
the state of affairs in Mexico which may give 
rise to war 1 

* Mr. Raymond : I beg to say to my friend 
from Yates, that this can scarcely be called a 
pending question, giving rise to immediate and 
overwhelming peril of invasion, even if the dif- 
ferences to which he refers should hereafter 
arise. I had intended therefore to discuss this 
Mexican question under another branch of my 
remarks, and trust the gentleman will allow me 
to defer my answer to his inquiry until then. I 
beg also to say that I do not regard questions or 
suggestions, as to what I may say, as interrup- 
tions, if they are pertinent and seem to be called 
for. I do not deprecate, I rather invite them. 

II. I come now to the second alleged cause of 
an apprehended war : WiU England attack us ? 
Is there any prospect,— any evidence,— any 
reasonable probability that she intends to do so ? 
It is said that she envies our prosperity, — that 
she hates our institutions, — that she fears our 
growing power and commercial rivalry, — that 
she would gladly see us crippled, and that she 
will take advantage of our domestic dissensions 
to strike a blow which shall humble our pride 
and destroy our power. I am willing to concede 
the truth of very much of this. I believe the 
ruling classes of England at once dislike and 
dread the ideas which lie at the basis of our gov- 
ernment, and that her people envy our freedom 
from many of the evils under which they groan, — 
the social equality of our citizens, the absence of 
privileged and ruling classes, an exemption from 
heavy and oppressive taxation, an exemption, 
however, which I fear may not long exist to ex- 
cite their envy. Granting all this, however, to 
its fullest extent, it will scarcely be contended 
that it threatens us with danger of impending 
war. There are very many other considerations 
to be taken into the account before we can infer 
that her envy of us will lead her to make war 
upon us. She will scarcely lighten the burdens 
of her own people by plunging into a war which 
may increase ours. Nor is she likely to make 
war upon us for the purpose, or in the hope, of 
converting us to faith in her form of govern- 
ment, or of disgusting her own people with ours. 
It seems to me that those who reason thus mis- 
take the character of the English people, and do 



DOt rightly appreciate the temper and spirit of 
the age. I do not suppose that the era of uni- 
versal peace is at hand. Nations, evidently, are 
not ready to beat all their spears into pruuing- 
liooks ; but there has certainly been a great 
advance in regard to the causes and objecfe 
of great wars within the last fifty or sixty 
years. Wars for mere conquest, — for the 
mere lust of land, or the mere pleasure of 
extended 'rule, are much rarer than they 
used to be : and wars for the propagation of 
monarchical ideas seem to me to belong wholly 
to the past. No nation, in my judgment, is 
likely soon again to wage a great war for the ex- 
tension' of monarchy, or for the extirpation of 
democratic sentiments and aspirations. Eng- 
land certainly will never be insane enough 
to plunge into war with the United States for 
such a purpose or with such a hope. She had 
a lesson on this subject in her great war with 
France, waged to crush out democracy in that 
country, which will prevent her from ever 
making the same attempt again. That great 
war, which deluged the whole of Europe in 
blood, and which sought to impose upon France 
a rule which her people hated, ended in planting 
the democratic idea so deeply in the French 
heart that under some form or other it has ever 
since ruled that country, and even now lies at 
the base of tlie democratic despotism which 
wields the power and represents the will of 
the forty millions of her people. War waged 
against a republic always propagates repub- 
lican ideas. The very attempt of England 
to break down our republican institutions 
would revolutionize England herself. I do not 
say that any war between England and the Uni- 
ted States would have this effect. But I do say, 
that any war waged against us for the avowed 
or evident purpose of overthrowing our form of 
government, and replacing it by monarchy or 
placing us at the mercy of monarchical powers, 
would revolutionize England in sixty days. No 
ministry could stand such an issue for an hour ; 
and if it should be made, the throne itself would 
not survive its trial. No English army, with 
such an object, could march a hundred miles 
into our country without losing half its numbers 
by desertion and the rest by surrender. When 
Mr. Seward proposed to permit British troops 
to cross the State of Maine on their way to 
Canada, what Avas the explanation of the English 



and Canadian press ? They charged him with 
seeking to bring British troops upon American 
soil knowing that they would desert ! They inter- 
prete(^ the motive by the result which they knew 
would follow the act. 

My friend from Ulster (Mr. Pierce), insisted 
that the distress into which the laboring classes i 
of England have been plunged by this war, wilt I 
comppl the government to break the blockade, , 
or take some other step which will lead to war. 
He drew a very graphic and, I fear, a very jus^ 
picture of the suffering which this war hs 
brought upon the classes who lived by their \i 
bor upon the raw material of which this war has 
deprived them. That suffering is intense, and i 
is wide-spread. But it has not deprived either : 
the government or the people themselves of their ( 
judgment and common sense. Both know per- ■ 
fectly well that any such remedy as the one • 
proposed would only aggravate infinitely the J 
evils it is intended to cure. It would add the ; 
pressure of war, the burdens of war, the hor- ■ 
rors, the griefs, the paralysis upon industry; 
which war inflicts, to the loss of employment t 
which the English people now sustain. It would! 
increase the price of bread, while it diminished^ 
the ability to pay for it. There is not, there- ■ 
fore, in my judgment, the slightest n 
to suppose that England will seek a wart 
with us from any such motive as the one al-- 
leged. On the contrary, that motive makes? 
peace her true policy, and we have every/ 
reason to believe that she will pursue it.i 

We must look elsewhere for a clue to the? 
probable policy of the English government. 
Colonies have ceased to be valuable to England 
as tributaries to her Avealth, and are now little 
more than burdensome jen'els in her imperial 
diadem. Canada, to which she has been forced 
to concede nearly all the privileges of self- 
government, involves her every year in actual 1 
expense, and the same thing is true of nearly, 
all her colonies. The only advantage which i 
she now derives from her colonial possessions • 
is the privilege of trading with them on terms ' 
of advantage. Indeed, the great want of Great t 
Britain at the present day is markets, — custom- 
ers. Her agriculture has become a secondary in|| 
terest. Commerce and manufactures rule her ( 
policy and shape her laws. It was this rapid I 
growth of her manufacturing system and the 
necessity of fortifying her commercial power 



that led her to adopt free trade. She owes her 
prosperity now to the fact that she is at once 
the work-shop and the carrier for the world. 
What she needs above all things, therefore, is 
easy access to the markets of the world. What 
she seeks from the United States is not their 
conquest, not the overthrow of their institu- 
tions, but the privilege of supplying their 
people with her manufactured goods. If she 
can fill our cities and villages, and supply 
the farm-houses and thriving towns of the 
mighty west with her wares, the products of 
the industry of her people, receiving in exchange 
the provisions which they need for their support, 
her own greatness and prosperity are secured. 
Whatever interferes with her plans for doing 
this, inflicts serious damage upon her interest, 
and serious suffering upon her people. 

This fact explains to my mind her discontent, — 
her indignant resentment, at our rebellion, and 
explains the course she has pursued in regard to 
it. With an Englishman, England's interest is the 
supreme law. He judges all the acts of all other 
nations, not in the least by their intrinsic equity, 
but by their bearing on the welfare of England. 
That shrewd observer and most accurate judge 
of the peculiarities of national character, M. de 
TocQUEViLLE, remarked, with perfect truth, in one 
of his charming letters to an English friend, that 
*' in the eye of an Englishman a cause is just, if it 
be the interest of England that it should succeed. 
The criterion of what is honorable, great or just, is 
to be found in the degree of favor or of opposition 
to English interests." When this rebellion first 
broke out, England saw that it would interrupt her 
trade with this country, cut off her supplies of cot- 
ton, and plunge a large portion of her people into 
poverty and distress. She was indignant at the 
whole country for permitting a rebellion attended 
with such results to occur. It was for her inte- 
rest tha+ the war in America should cease, and 
she pursued that course which she thought most 
likely to bring about that result. Looking at 
the matter from a distance, and without the 
slightest regard to the justice of the case, she 
believed that we could not subdue the South, 
and that the only way by which peace could be 
restored and her trade resumed was for the Uni- 
ted States to let the revolted States alone. She, 
therefore, favored this policy — urging it through 
all her organs of opinion and of influence, and 
substantiaUy espousing, actually though un- 



officially, the cause of Southern independ- 
ence, not from any special sympathy with the 
South, nor from any special hatred to the 
North, but from a profound regard to her own 
interest and a sincere desire for the suspen- 
sion of the war and the resumption of her trade 
with both sections of the United States. What 
she sought from the outset, and what she seeks 
still, is the speediest possible termination of the 
war, for the sake of her own commerce and 
manufactures. She has favored the South 
hitherto because she believed that the war 
would be soonest ended in that way. When she 
sees that the South is losing ground, and that 
the North is gaining, — she will see that the end 
of the war will be sooner reached by the triumph 
of the government ; and then, from precisely 
the same motives that influenced her before, her 
sympathies will be on the other side. 

But nothing can be more preposterous than to 
imagine that she will ever seek to end the war 
by taking part in it herself. As my friend from 
St. Lawrence (Mr. Redington) remarked, the 
English are not an ignorant people, nor is her 
government in the hands of stolid men. They 
know that their active participation in the con- 
test in any way, and especially as an enemy of 
the United States, would only prolong the war 
indefinitely. There is not the slightest reason, in 
my judgment, to anticipate such a proceeding 
on her part. We are a comparatively young 
nation — strong in material resources, stronger 
in self-confident reliance upon our strength ; 
just fitting ourselves by the discipline of this 
war for such a struggle as England's active hos- 
tility would bring upon us. Does she not know 
that in such a contest all the advantage would 
be on our side — that whatever might be the dam- 
age she could inflict upon us at the beginning, 
every blow she might strike would only render 
impossible the termination of the war until it 
had bpen fully repaid ? Is she mad enough to 
suppose that by attacking and seizing our ports 
by destroying the city of New York, by block" 
ading our harbors, by making predatory and 
destructive incursions upon our frontiers, she 
would put an end to the war which interrupts 
her commerce and throws her laboring popula- 
tion out of employment ? No, sir. She knows 
very well that such a war thus begun would 
never end until one country or the other had 
exhausted its resources and received a death-blow 



to its prosperity. And she knows, moreover, 
which of the two would be the most likely to 
incur that fate — an old country, pressed already 
by an enormous debt, surrounded by watchful 
and jealous powers upon her own continent, 
separated by three thousand miles from her 
enemy, and having in her bosom a large and 
powerful element of sympathy with our institu- 
tions — or a youDg people, rich, haughty, tena- 
cious and proud, fighting at their own threshold, 
and animated by ambitions and hopes that Eng- 
land has long survived. Such a contest would 
be one of madness, and there is no statesman, 
no leading man of any party in England, that 
dare provoke it. 

But my friend from Clinton (Mr. Stetson) 
made the inquiry of my colleague (Mr. Phelps), 
the other day, *' What means this sending of 
troops to Canada V and the gentleman from St. 
Lawrence (Mr. Hulburd) referred, in proof of 
the warlike intentions of England, to the fact 
that military guards had been stationed at the 
locks of her Canadian canals, and that upon 
some of those locks these guards have been 
lately doubled. Well, sir, that does not seem to 
me a very threatening incident. So far as 
it proves anything, it indicates to my mind 
that Canada fears invasion from us, ra- 
ther than that she has any intention of inva- 
diog us. I doubt, however, whether it has 
one whit more importance than the fact that 
military guards have been pacing up and down 
in front of our arsenal at Troy, for the last 
twenty years. It indicates an intention simply 
to protect by military vigilance the military pro- 
perty of the province. And if the gentleman 
from Clinton will permit me to answer the ques- 
tion which he asked my colleague, in regard to 
the object of sending troops to Canada, I will say 
that I believe it to have been mainly, if not 
wholly, a defensive measure. 

Mr. Stetson : — Does my friend believe that 
it had any connection with the Trent afiair "? 

Mr. Raymond : — Unquestionably, it had a very 
direct connection. 

Mr. Stetson : — There its meaning was war, un- 
less we yielded to the demands of Great Britain 
in regard to the affair. 

Mr. Raymond : — Undoubtedly. That was pre- 
cisely its meaning. So long as those demands 
were not responded to, there was danger of war. 
But they were yielded, and then the danger dis- 



appeared. As to the merits of that particular 
question I shall have more to say hereafter. But 
it will be remembered that troops had been sent f 
to Canada long before the Trent aflSair, immedi- 
ately indeed upon the outbreak of our rebellion. 
Our minister in London, under instructions from 
the government at Washington, asked explana- 
tions. Earl Russell replied to Mr. Adams that it i 
was intended, not in the least as a menace, but as 
purely a precautionary measure. He represented 
that in the midst of such a war as disturbed the 
United States, it was impossible to say how far 
British interests might be affected ; — thfit move- J 
ments of sympathy with one party or the other 
might occur in Canada : that these might be re- 
sented from the other side; and that it was deemed I 
wise in this, as in all similar cases, to send a force; 
sufficient to protect the inierests and preserve the 
neutrality of the Canadian frontier. 

Mr. Stetson: — If that was a wise policy forr 
them, with regard to contiguous territory, I beg 
to ask why it is not a wise policy for us also 1 

Mr. Raymond : — It is the best policy in the 
world. It is precisely the policy which I trust t 
the General Government will adopt. It certainly i 
belongs to that government to adopt it ; and the; 
emergency which it supposes is not such as toi 
demand a departure from usage or warrant the 2 
interposition of the State. 

Mr. Pierce : — We have been waiting for the 
General Government to do that very thing now 
for years, but in vain. She seems now as she 
always has seemed utterly insensible to the mo- 
mentous dangers to which we are exposed. 
Three years ago, when war seemed impending 
we called on her for aid, but she refused it. Two 
years ago we renewed the call with the same re- 
sult. One year ago it was again repeated, but 
nothing whatever was done. It is time now, sir, 
that the State took the matter into her own hands. 

Mr. Raymond : — Three years, two years and one 
year ago, then, we thought we were on the brink 
of war, and called on the National Government . 
for aid. That government did not think we were '. 
on the verge of war. I ask my friend from Ul- • 
ster which of the two proved to be right ? [Ap- 
plause and laughter] May not the same thing ; 
be true in the present instance 1 

Mr. Pierce : — Congress has remained in ses^ 
sion now four months without doing anything 
for us, and would never have thought of doing 
anything if the bottom of the Treasury had not 
been reached. [Laughter.] 



XJL 



Mr. Raymond : My friend from Ulster is alto- 
gether too impetuous. The instant he foresees 
Dr suspects a danger, he would have Congress 
'vvjv. id A against it. For the past three or four 
y^ears he has believed we were on the eve of war, 
ind has been patriotically indignant that Con- 
Tress could not see it. Congress thus far, how- 
ver, has proved to be right. Now he knows 
;he danger is at hand, and is again indignant at 
she apparent insensibility of the general govern- 
ment to a peril that seems to him so palpable, 
[t is barely possible, he will concede, that he 
may be again mistaken. At all events he is, to 
my mind, somewhat too impatient. Great na- 
;ions, like all great bodies, move slowly. It 
ioes not become them to act rashly or under 
:he influence of a panic. If the government be- 
ieved we were on the verge of war with Eng- 
and or any other power, I believe they would 
make preparation for such an emergency with 
ill due dispatch. The fact that they move de- 
iberately in the matter, proves to my mind that 
hey do not believe the peril to be so imminent 
is my friend from Ulster supposes. 

Mr. Pierce : But they did not prepare for 
fvar while the Trent affair was pending ; and 
hen, the gentleman from New York concedes, 
there was imminent danger of war. 

Mr. Raymond : My friend must bear in mind 
hat the government at Washington knows a 
good deal more about the exact state of our 
foreign relations than we can know here. That 
government knew from the beginning, what we 
lid not, that all danger of war could and would 
be averted by yielding to the demand of Great 
Britain in regard to the Trent affair. Therefore 
It was that they did not deem preparation for 
war at all essential. They knew that the differ- 
3nce would be arranged without an appeal to 
arms, and on that account they did not deem it 
necessary to plunge into hasty and undignified 
preparations for hostilities. I think the event 
shows that, in this as in the other instances 
referred to, the government was right. 

Now a word more in regard to the point 
of which I was speaking when these inter- 
ruptions occurred — the motives of England 
n sending troops to Canada. Her apprehension 
of possible disturbance along the frontier seem 
Sto me not to have been unreasonable. We were 
i in the first flush of our flrst military demonstra- 
itions on a large scale. For the first time in our 



history we saw five or six hundred thousand 
men in arms upon our soil, and under our flag. 
We were naturally enough a little excited by the 
sight of so many bayonets. We were dazzled bj' 
our unaccustomed epaulettes. The military 
spirit of the country was beginning to be arous- 
ed, and, as will always happen in such cases, it 
led to some extravagancies of sentiment and of 
speech. We began to anticipate the hour when 
the rebellion should be crushed, and when 
we should sigh for new foes to conquer. The 
burly and tempting form of John Bull rose in 
our path, and we began to ponder and to speak 
of the old accounts we had to settle with him ; and 
some of our loudest and least respectable brag- 
garts of the press dealt largely in ferocious proclam- 
ations of the designs we cherished against Great 
Britain, and of the certainty that they would be 
carried into effect the moment we should have 
conquered the Southern rebellion. Indeed, you 
will remember that it was announced in one of 
these journals, and pertinaciously repeated, day 
after day, as from official authority, that the 
government intended to pick a quarrel with 
Great Britain as the surest means of re-uniting 
the North and South in the bonds of Union It 
is impossible for any man, not thoroughly ac- 
quainted with the statistics of idiocy or the in- 
nate and reckless depravity of men who are 
willing thus to imperil the public peace, duly 
to appreciate the effect of such mischievous 
falsehoods. But they had a very marked effect 
in England. They created there the impression 
that we were determined upon war with Great 
Britain. When our great military chieftain, Gen. 
Scott, returned from Europe, while the Trent 
affair was pending, he stated expressly that he 
did so because he believed the two countries 
were on the brink of war, and that scarcely a 
man could be found in England who did not 
think so likewise. I asked him why they 
thought so: he replied because they believed, 
one and all, that we were determined upon war, 
and that we had committed what they styled the 
Trent outrage as the initial step of such a Vvar. It 
seems incredible that such an apprehension 
should take possession of a great and intelligent 
community. But it will seem less so, if we re- 
member that there is nothing too absurd for 
nations, or armies, or legislatures, or individ- 
uals, to do, when they act under the influence 
of a panic. Call to mind the panic that prevailed 



in England in 1859, during the Italian war, when 
the Emperor of the French went to the aid of the 
king of Sardinia in his contest with Austria. 
Although the emperor had taken every possible 
precaution to reassure England and all Europe 
as to his designs, the whole press, the parliament 
and the great mass of the people of England 
were absolutely convulsed with the shuddering 
belief that everything he was doing was merely 
a preliminary step to his invasion of England. 
To a stranger on the spot, as I happened to be at 
the time, the spectacle would have been ludi- 
crous if it had not been humiliating. Even the 
greatest and best men in England — even so great, 
so wise, so experienced a man as Lord Lynd- 
HtTRST — yielded to the contagion, and could not 
hear with patience any person who doubted 
that Louis Napoleon would attempt to land on 
the shores of England within sixty days ! When 
John Bull does get into a panic or a passion, he 
is a sight worth seeing ! His rage is quite as edi- 
fying, and is often excited with quite as little 
reason, as that of any other animal of the same 
nature or name. [Laughter.] 

Now, Sir, I find no difficulty in satisfying my 
own mind by such considerations as these, ;hat 
the dispatch of troops to Canada was mainly a 
defensive and precautionary measure on the part 
of the English government, and that it does not 
indicate any intention on the part of Great Bri- 
tain, of making war upon us, nor does it create 
any such emergency as would demand or war- 
rant the passage of this bill. Yet I would treat 
with great respect the opinions of gentlemen who 
differ from me on this point. I can make great 
allowance certainly for the somewhat excited 
sentiments of my friend from Clinton (Mr. 
Stetson). He lives on the sacred soil of Platts- 
burgh, where the very air is redolent with 
memories of heroic sacrifice, and of glorious 
victories over the English flag. History tells us 
of an ancient statesman whom the trophies 
of Miltiades would not let sleep. I can well 
imai^ine that the memories of McComb and 
McDoNOUGH disturb the waking visions of the 
gentleman from Clinton. Let me, then, for- 
tify what I have said, by what ought to have 
weight with him and every other member of this 
House, the official declaration on this very point 
of the recognized head of the British govern- 
ment. On the 17th of last month a debate oc- 
curred in the House of Commons on this subject. 



Mr. Bright arraigned the government for having 
incurred a needless expense of nearly a million 
pounds sterling, by sending troops to Canada, 
when there was no occasion for such a step, j 
Lord Palmerston, in reply, rehearsed the his- 
tory of the Trent affair, quoted the approbation 
expressed in the United States of the act of 
Capt. Wilkes, and gave many and cogent rea- 
sons for the belief which prevailed in England, 
that the United States government would incur 
the hazards of a war, rather than surrender the : 
prisoners who had been taken from the Trent. 
He then added : 

" What was considered by the Americans to be our 
weak point, and what was the circumstance which made 
the United States always more difficult to deal with by 
England than by France? It was the thought that 
Canada and the British North American Colonies were 
defenceless. [Cheers.] What, then, was it our duty to 
do ? It was to strengthen them, and make the Ameri- 
cans see that we were able to defend ourselves on that 
point which they thought to be the most vulnerable and 
most easily accessible to them. [Hear, hear.] That 
was not 'ferocious gesticulations.' [Hear, hear, and 
laughter.] It was simply a defensive measure — [hear]~ 
it was simply strengthening that part which had been 
weak and might be attacked., and the knowledge of the 
weakness of which might induce the Americans to main- 
tain that position ichich they had up to that moment oc- 
cupied—to retain these men in prison and refuse to com- 
ply with our demand for their restoration. [Hear, hear. 1 
Therefore, so far from Her Majesty's Government being 
obnoxious to blame, I think that the Government are 
deserving of commendation for what they did ; and, 
though they performed no more than their duty, they 
performed it promptly and efficiently, and have met 
with, I believe, the approbation of the country at large. 
[Cheers.] I think, then, that the censure of my hono- 
rable friend, the member for Birmingham, is not de- 
served, and that what we did loas not at all calculated 
to provoke the Government of the United States. It was 
simply a measure which it was our bounden duty to 
take, seeing the uncertainty of the result of the commu- 
nications carried out from this country. So far from 
any feeling of ineradicable irritation between the two 
cou7ilries being engendered by the course pursued, I be- 
lieve that a contrary cotcrse would have produced such a 
result." 

I am aware that it is not always safe to rely 
implicitly upon official explanations of this kind. 
But this is so natural, — so thoroughly conform 
able to the common sense of the case, that I 
believe it to be sincere. It affords what I regard 
as a sufficient explanation of the whole matter. 
It answers the question of my friend from 
Clinton, and satisfies me that these troops were 
not sent to Canada with any purpose or thought 
of invading the United States, Indeed, with all 
his pluck and recklessness, I do not think John 
Bull is in the least likely to invade this country 
with 18,000 men, when he could be met at any 
point of the frontier he might select with a forcej^: 
four times as large. 

Now, sir, I think these reasons sufBcie^jt to 
show that England does not intend to attack us. 
At all events they show that her purpose of in- 



vasion is not so clear and unmistakable as to 
create the emergency which alone can justify 
the passage of this bill. 

III. I come now to the third branch of these 
remarks : — Bo ive intend to makewar upon England ? 
For this is the only remaining contingency 
which can make war probable between the two 
countries. Is there any reason to believe that 
we have any such intention 1 Is there any good 
and solid ground for such a purpose. 

Sentiments have been uttered on this floor, and 
are perhaps somewhat widely cherished else- 
wkere,which apparently indicate a willingness on 
our part to invite such an issue. My friend from 
Ulster [Mr. Pierce], said that we have old scores 
to settle with Great Britain — that nothing but 
our temporary weakness leads us to brook her 
insolence, and that as soon as we have done with 
this rebellion we shall punish England for her 
insults and for her misconduct generally. Now 
I must say, sir, that I do not like this style of 
treating grave questionSj involving peace or war 
between two of the greatest powers of the earth. 
I intend nothing personally oflFensive, certainly, 
but it does not seem to me either dignified or 
worthy of men holding responsible public posi- 
tions. If we have scores to settle, let us settle 
them as we go along. If we have insults to re- 
sent, let us resent them on the spot, or else forget 
them. Let us lay up no grudges. If we are too 
weak to maintain our honor or protect our inter- 
est now, let us submit with the dignity of self- 
respect to our position. This feeling that when 
we are grown up we will chastise the school- 
master used to be rather common, I remember, 
among school-boys : but as we grew older we 
became ashamed of it, and discovered gradually 
that we had something else and something bet- 
ter to do. Let us not now, in the grave duties of 
public life, imitate the follies of our boyish 
days. Thus far, in our history, we have proved 
ourselves quite competent to defend our na- 
tional honor. I have no fears that we shall 
fall short of it. eiilier in purpose or ability, now. 

But, sir, even if this were not so, if there were 
old scores to be paid off at some future time, I 
can hardly suppose that the State of New York 
is to take the lead in this work of ex post facto 
revenge. She need not arm herself in hot 
haste for such a purpose. That duty, if a duty 
it be, will devolve upon the general government, 
I shall be content, and I think this state will be 



content, to follow the lead of that government, 
on such a subject. If our aid is required it will 
be afforded. But until it is called for, we depart 
widely from the sphere of our duty in taking 
action upon such a subject, for such a purpose. 

And now I might very well leave this point, 
with this suggestion. It covers the whole ground 
and offers, in my judgment, a sufficient reason 
why this bill should not become a law. But, if 
I do not trespass too much upon the patience of 
the committee, I should be glad to examine some 
of the alleged complaints against Grreat Britain, — 
some of the facts cited as laying the foundations 
for that hostility which can only be satisfied by 
war. What, then, are these complaints % 

I hear a good deal said about England's want 
of sympathy with us in our attempts to put down 
the rebellion. She has given us the cold should- 
er. In spite of all her pretended dislike of sla- 
very, she has not shown the slightest sympathy 
with the effort of the government to crush the 
rebellion which has grown out of the attempt of 
slavery to maintain, perpetuate and increase its 
political power. As to the sincerity or hypocrisy 
of her professed sentiments concerning slavery, 
England must be her own judge. We are not 
responsible for her consistency. We have 
never believed her very sincere and have no 
right, therefore, to be disappointed when she 
proves the justice of our distrust. It would have 
been pleasanter, doubtless, to have had her sym- 
pathy, her encouragement, her good wishes, in 
this day of our calamity. But we can do with- 
out them. We are too strong to need them, and 
we ought to be too proud to complain if they 
are withheld. Nations, moreover, as such, have 
no sympathies with other nations. Their rela- 
tions are those of interest, of mutual respect, but 
rarely, if ever, of sentiment. What one nation 
can gain from another by befriending her usually 
measures the extent of her friendship. Besides, 
if this were not so, have we any special claim 
upon England for her sympathy in the present 
instance? How have we established such a 
claim ? Was it by sympathizing with her when 
she was at war with Russia, or when she was 
seeking to put down rebellion in India? Did 
our sympathies gush forth towards the English 
government when she sought, a few years since, 
to trample down a small rebellion in Ireland ? 
Have we ever sympathized with any European 
power in any such case of contest with rebellion 



against its authority ? Did we sympathize with 
Austria when she contended against rebellion in 
Hungary and in Italy ? 

Mr. ScHOLEFiELD : I would like to ask the 
gentleman whether the United States have not 
sympathized with Italy as against Austria, — 
with Ireland as against England — whether our 
sympathies were not with Hungary and with the 
South American Republics in their struggles for 
independence ? 

Mr. RATM0^^D : Certainly they were. We have 
always sympathized with every rebellion against 
any established government. We sympathized 
with Ireland and with Canada in their rebellion 
against Great Britain. And England is only pay- 
ing us off with a little of our own coin, in sympa- 
thizing with those who are in rebellion against us. 
We are the children of rebellion. We won our 
own independence by it, and our sympathy goes 
naturally with every other community engaged 
in a similar effort. 

Mr. Redingtoit : The gentleman does not mean 
to say that our sympathies go with the southern 
rebels ? [Laughter.] 

Mr. Raymond : Oh no ! Not at all. That is a 
"horse of another color." It is our ox that is 
gored in this case, and that fact changes essen- 
tially the complexion of the whole affair. [Loud 
laughter.] 

We have not had the sympathies of England in 
this contest, nor can I say that I think we had 
any fair claim upon them, or any good ground 
for complaint that they were withheld. Certainly 
it affords no possible ground for war, or for che- 
rishing such resentments as must of necessity 
lead to war. All we have a right to demand of 
any nation in such a case is, that she shall not 
aid our enemies — that she shall remain neutral. 
It is alleged, I admit, that England has not done 
this — that she has in various ways encouraged 
the rebels in the Southern States ; and to a cer- 
tain degree the charge is true, I think that her 
moral attitude at all events has been one of en- 
couragement to the rebels, and of consequent 
unfriendliness to us. I have nothing to say — 
not the slightest disposition to say anything, in 
excuse for her conduct in that respect. But I 
shall say, what I think can be justly said, that, 
judged by the rules of international law, the gov- 
ernment of Great Britain has substantially main- 
tained her position as a neutral power. 1 do 



not see any point on which her conduct can be 
successfully arraigned at that tribunal. 

Mr. Pierce : How was it in the matter of the 
Nashviile and Tuscarora 1 

Mr. Ogdex : How in the matter of the stone 
blockade ? 

Mr. Raymond : I will refer to both these 
points in their proper order. But let me fol- 
low the order of time and speak first of the 
first of her offences, — the one which excited 
most resentment throughout this country, and 
which has seemed to me much less defensible 
than her action in either of the cases named. I 
mean the original recognition of the South as a 
belligerent power, — and the concession to her ol 
belligerent rights. I have always felt that in 
that act, at the very outset of the war, she gave 
the rebellion great encouragement, and seemed 
almost to insult the government of the United 
States by placing the pretended authorities of the 
rebel states on a level with us. That certainly 
was a galling position for us to hold. But it is 
not well to exaggerate the real meaning of that 
act on the part of England. It did not establish 
or intimate any equality between us and the re- 
bels, except what might grow out of the fact 
that we both vievejighting, and that we ought to 
fight on the common basis of a recognized 
war. We were to meet as equals in rights 
there, but nowhere else. That was all which 
this act of England implied. She refused 
then, and has refused ever since, to recog- 
nize the South in any other light, or even to 
hold intercourse with her representatives. It is 
only fair to remember also that in doing this she 
acted in concert with France and all the other 
European powers, and that she saved herself 
and saved us, from some complications to which 
otherwise the progress of the war might have 
given rise, and which might have proved ex- 
tremely awkward. Suppose, for example,she had 
not thus recognized them. To whom could she 
have looked for redress in case one of her ves- 
sels had been overhauled by a rebel privateer, 
but to the government of the United States ? 
Upon whom could she have had any claim for 
the release of British subjects impressed into 
the rebel army, but upon the government of 
the United States ? I do not assign this as a 
sufficient justification for the course which she has 
pursued. But these are among the things 
which show that there may be two sides even 



to this, which is perhaps the most questionable 
of all her acts. 

And now in regard to the Nashville and Tus- 
carora. Having recognized the two as belligerent 
powers, and declared herself neutral as between 
them, she was bound to extend precisely the 
same rights and the same privileges to both. The 
Nashville was duly commissioned by the rebel 
authorities, so far as they can duly commission 
anything, as a war vessel ; when she came to 
Southampton she was entitled to the hospitality 
of the port, precisely as was the Tuscarora or 
any other vessel of the United States. I believe 
it is conceded that she received nothing more. 
She was permitted to repair and refit for sea and 
to take on board provisions. This the rules of 
international law permit. But she was not al- 
lowed to take on board a single gun, or a single 
pound of powder or to enlist and ship a single 
man. At least I have never seen any proof that 
she was permitted to do any one of these things, 
or anything else which the requirements of neu- 
trality in such cases prohibit. The hardest thing 
of all was that when the Nashville left the port, 
the Tuscarora was forcibly detained from depart- 
ing to follow her, until twenty-four hours after- 
wards : and yet I believe that, even in this, 
England only enforced a rule which is impera- 
tive upon all belligerent vessels under such cir- 
cumstances in a neutral port. That point I think 
my friend from Clinton [Mr. Stetson], who is 
much more familiar with such matters than I 
am, will concede. 

Mr. Stetson : I do not dispute it. 

Mr. Raymond : I believe it has always been re- 
cognized and acted upon by our own government. 
During the war between England and France, 
while Mr. Jefferson was Secretary of State, I 
think it was distinctly set forth in his letters to 
M. Genet, the French minister, and that all our 
public officers were required in circulars issued 
from the department of state, to see that it was 
enforced. Even in this affair, therefore, I think 
my friend from Ulster must concede that the 
action of England has been conformable to the 
requirements of international law, and that we 
cannot, therefore, make it a ground of just com- 
plaint. 

Mr. Pierce : She has also refused our vessels 
the right to visit her ports, except under great 
restrictions, — which is a courtesy never denied, 
I believe, to vessels of a friendly power. 



Mr. Raymond. Nevertheless, it is a courtesy 
she has a right to withhold, and which we can 
scarcely blame her for withholding, if conceding 
it becomes seriously embarrassing, by making 
her ports or her neutral waters the scene of pos- 
sible conflict between two belligerents. 

Mr. Pierce. What I intended to say, in my 
remarks upon this point the other day, was that 
the affair of the Tuscarora and Nashville has 
shown the unfriendly spirit of England towards 
us, and should lead us as a nation to look for- 
ward and prepare for emergencies that may be 
close upon us. 

Mr. Raymond. I will admit that. I do think 
the spirit exhibited in that affair was not friendly, 
and that it should put us on our guard against 
future contingencies. But does it create such 
an emergency, is it such a reason, as imposes 
upon this state the necessity of taking such ac- 
tion as this bill proposes ? 

Mr. Pierce. Let me ask the gentleman, if 
there was one chance in a hundred that before 
this Legislature should meet again, hostilities 
would break out between us and England, would 
that be a sufficient reason for our arming for de- 
fence, in his judgment 1 

Mr. Raymond — No, sir, not for the state's 
arming. 

Mr. Pierce — If there was one chance in ten, 
how would it be ? 

Mr. Raymond — Well, sir, I am not quite pre- 
pared to settle the matter on such an arithmeti- 
cal basis. I should need to cipher a little, per- 
haps, to give an intelligent answer. But I do 
not think I should regard even that as a suffi- 
cient reason for passing this bill. 

Mr. Pierce — I certainly would; and the differ- 
ence between the gentleman's patriotism and 
mine is that, while he hesitates about having the 
state arm against one chance in ten of an inva- 
sion, I would arm against one in a hundred. 

Mr. Raymond — Well, sir, the gentleman will 
bear in mind that he has not shown even one 
chance in a hundred of an invasion from Eng- 
land within the time specified. And if there 
were one chance in ten, or one in a hun- 
dred of such an event, I am quite certain that 
there are ninety-nine chances in a hundred that 
the General Government would detect it sooner 
than either of us, and would be quite as well 
prepared to meet it ; and I should, therefore, pre- 
fer leaving it entirely in their hands. 



Mr. Pierce : I think history is against you. 

Mr. Raymond: I think not. But enough, 
sir, upon this point. Suffice it to say that for 
the reasons given, I see nothing in any of these 
acts which creates such an emergency as this 
bill contemplates. 

)I come now to another reason which has been 
assigned for believing, that we shall ere long de- 
clare war against Great Britain, The gentleman 
from Ulster (Mr. Pierce), says that we have 
been humiliated and disgraced by the Britsh 
government, and that our people will not only 
never submit to such humiliations in the future, 
but will insist upon revenging and redressing 
those we have already sustained. The gentle- 
man specified three conspicuous instances of this 
humiliation at the hands of Great Britain. The 
first was the Trent aflfair, which be said " was 
settled to our humiliation as a people, and that 
the country would never again submit to such 
indignity." The gentleman subsequently re- 
peated : 

" that the humiliation submitted to in this case was not 
owing to any sense of inability to cope with our adver- 
sary under other circumstancep, and at other times, but 
tee were forced to it by the defenseless condition of our 
harbors and frontiers, and from the fact that our land 
and naval forces were otherwise engaged. But it would 
not always be so, and he warned the House and the 
country to 6e read;/ /or the charge and the onset when 
that day should arrive.''^ 

Now, sir, I have the honor to say that I differ 
toto coelo from the gentleman on this point. I do 
not concede the justice of his remarks in a sin- 
gle particular. I believe that, from the begin- 
ning to the present time, during this rebellion, 
the rights of this country have been maintained, 
and its honor preserved intact, against foreign 
powers ; and in no case more conspicuously than 
in this very aflfair of the Trent. I believe, sir, 
that the action of our government in this instance 
will form one of the brightest chapters in our 
national history, and will win for us the admira- 
tion of posterity, as it now commands for us the 
respect and esteem of every nation, and of the 
world. 

What now were the circumstances of that 
affair 1 A neutral vessel, bearing the flag of a 
neutral power, going from one neutral port to 
another, was boarded by an American man of 
war, and four persons taken by force from on 
board of her, brought into port and committed 
to prison. That was substantially the whole 
transaction. Let me say here that I sympathized 
with the whole country in the gallantry and 



heroism of the act. I never doubted for a mo- 
ment that Capt. Wilkes acted from the most 
patriotic motives, and from a sincere belief, in , 
the abgence of instructions, that he was doing 
what he had a perfect right to do under the law 
of nations. I joined in praising him for it : as a 
personal and professional act I think he deserved 
all the praise he received. I rejoiced, moreover, 
in common with every loyal heart, that these 
four " infernal scoundrels," as my friend from 
St. Lawrence (Mr. Redington) very justly, but 
perhaps somewhat strongly, styles them, had 
been interrupted on their voyage of treason, and 
had found their proper quarters in Fort Warren. 
It was comfortable to think that they had found 
at last their proper place, and the whole country 
gave itself up for the moment to the satisfaction 
which that fact inspired. 

But we were soon called upon to face quite 
another aspect of this aflfair. We were com- 
pelled to ask how it stood in the eye of those 
principles we had always maintained in regard 
to the rights and immunities of neutral powers. 
From the beginning of our national career our 
position had been almost without interruption, 
that of a neutral. We were remote from the 
great theatre of wars, and our interest lay largely 
in liberating commerce from the perils with 
which war surrounds it. We had always sought, 
therefore, to enlarge the privileges and exempt- 
ions of neutrals. We had always contended for 
the most liberal interpretation which could pos- 
sibly be given to international law in this regard. 
We had insisted that neutral goods on an enemy's 
ship should be held harmless, — that enemy's 
goods on a neutral ship should be untouched, 
— that the neutral flag should cover and protect 
the cargo. And especially had we insisted, as 
against Great Britain, and had waged one war 
with her in support of the claim, that no naval 
oflficer should take from on board a neutral ship 
any person under the protection of its flag, and 
assume to determine his character, or to dispose 
of him in any way without due process of law. 
Great Britain, being a naval power and resting 
upon her navy as the great bulwark of her 
strength, resisted these claims and had excluded 
the principles out of which they grew from the 
international code. Now, this act of Capt. 
Wilkes was in direct and flagrant violation of 
the principles for which we had always con- 
tended on this very subject. If our government 



had sustained it they would have stultified every 
act of our past history, and would have aban- 
doned, utterly and hopelessly, the attempt to 
eugraft our principles concerning neutral rights 
upon the code of maritime law. 

My friend from St. Lawrence (Mr. Reding- 
ton), referred in this connection to some articles 
which appeared in the New York Times upon 
this subject, in which he is pleased to say 
the action of Capt. Wilkes was triumphantly 
vindicated against the British, and that he hopes 
I will adhere to the same position now. Now, 
sir, I read those articles ; and, " not to put too 
fine a point upon it," I may add that some of 
them I wrote. And, in the main, so far as I 
remember them, I still hold to the leading prin- 
ciples which they embraced. When we first 
heard of the capture of these men, our first sen- 
timent was one of unbounded and unmixed sat- 
isfaction. The next was one of inquiry — can 
Great Britain complain of the act ? That was 
the question which came iip first, and the arti- 
cles to which the gentleman from St. Lawrence 
refers, discussed that question and that alone. 
We found, or thought we found, abundant evi- 
dence that, tried by British law and British 
precedent, the act of Capt, Wilkes was perfectly 
justifiable ; and the very general verdict of the 
country was that England could not complain of 
the act without abandoning her traditionary 
position, and substantially conceding the claims 
of the United States on the subject of neutral 
rights. But she did complain. And then our 
government was compelled to judge the act on 
American grounds, and to test it by our. own prin- 
ciples and precedents. And that, as I have 
already stated, led to a very difi"erent conclusion* 

Mr. Pierce : Did not Congress indorse the 
act of Capt. Wilkes ? 

Mr, Phelps : Only the House of Representa- 
tives. 

Mr. Raymond : Only one bi'anch of Congress 
approved it, and that was done far more as a 
personal compliment to Capt. Wilkes than as a 
declaration of the principles of international law. 

Mr. Stet on : Does the gentleman from New 
York believe that England acted in conformity 
with her own principles in the affair of the 
Trent ? 

Mr. Raymond : Certainly not. She came for 
the moment upon our ground, — she conceded 
ad hoc the position we had always held. 
2 



Mr. Stetson : Does he not see that this action 
on her part shows the depth of her hostility ? 

Mr. Raymond : I do not catch the point of 
my friend's argument. If he means to say 
that, because she conceded our ground on the 
subject of neutral rights, therefore she m^ans to 
go to war with us, I can only say that he re- 
minds me of the argument embodied in the 
English couplet — 

" My wound ie great because it is so small : — 

Then it were greater were it none at all." [Laughter.l 

Mr. Stetson : The hostile purpose of Eng- 
land was manifest ifi this, that she made conces- 
sion of a doctrine she had maintained in order 
to accomplish her object and find a pretext for 
war. 

Mr. Raymond : I must be somewhat muddled 
this evening, for I cannot see the conclusiveness 
of my friend's argument, even yet. If she aban- 
doned her own principles in the hope and belief 
that we would also abandon ours, and go to war 
for the purpose of proving that we had always 
been wrong and that she had always been right, 
the result showed that she was greatly mistaken. 
But I do not believe that she acted under any 
such motive. I think she was stung, as we 
should have been under similar circumstances, 
by the disregard and desecration of her flag, and 
that she would have gone to war in vindication 
of it, had we refused the redress which she de- 
manded, and which we could not refuse without 
' abandoning our own principles and our own po- 
sition ; and in granting that redress, I think our 
Government did exactly right. 

Mr. Pierce : If the United States Government 
had at once made that concession, it would have 
been all well. Then the United States would 
have carried out our principles truly. It should 
have been done at her own instance, if she would 
claim consistency on the ground of former pre- 
cedents. But she waited until the British lion 
showed his teeth, and then she yielded and stul- 
tified herself. Did not Mr. Seward maintain that 
Captain Wilkes was right in what he did, if he 
had only carried it out rightly ? If he had 
brought the matter before the courts it would 
have been right. 

Mr. Raymo>'D — That is substantially Mr. Sew- 
ard's position. 

Mr. Pierce — Then he was right in doing the 
act, but technically wrong in not complying with 
the law in regard to such transactions ? 



Mr. Raymond — Yes, ifyonclioose so to state it. 
In other words, if Capt. Wilkes had done some- 
thing entirely differeot from what he actually 
did, his action wcnld have been legal and right. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Pierce — His fault was merely technical. 

Mr. Raymond — All violation of law is, in one 
sense, merely technical. It is the technicality 
that makes the law, and a violation of the tech- 
nicality is a violation of the law. If Capt. 
Wilkes had sunk the Trent, instead of bringing 
her into port, he would have technically violated 
the law. He would have done something which 
the law forbids, and would not have done some- 
thing which the law enjoins. That was precisely 
what he did in this case, and, .therefore, his act 
was in violation of law. 

The gentleman from Ulster insists that if our 
government had corrected the error of its own 
motion, upon first receiving intelligence of the 
act, it would have been all right; it could then 
have done so with honor ; but that having failed 
to do so its subsequent compliance with the de- 
mand of the British government was humiliating 
and degrading. I apprehend the gentleman is 
not as familiar with the facts of this transaction 
a? he should have been. I beg to remind him 
[hat our government did, subs'antially, what he 
requires — did all that it could do with propriety 
!it the very outset. In a despatch dated Nov. 30, 
written immediately after hearing of the affair 
of the Trent, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams 
fts follows : 

"Since that conversation (between Lord Palracrston 
and Mr. Adams] was held, Captain Wilkes, in the 
gteaiTier San Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial 
steamer and taken from her deck two insurgents who 
■were proceeding to Europe on an errand of treason 
against their own country This is a new incident, un- 
known to and unforseen, at least in its circumstHiices, 
by Lord Palmerston. IL is to be met and disposfd of by 
the two gorernments, if possible, in '.he spirit [of uniily\ 
to which I have adverted. Lord Lyons has prndeiitiy 
refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I presume, 
waiting instructions from home. We have done noth- 
ing on the suVj.ject to anticipate the discussion, and we 
have not furnished you with anj- explinatinns. We ad- 
here to that course now, because we think it more pru- 
dent that the ground taken by the British governmnt 
should be first made knoicn to us here, and that the dis- 
cus'ion, If there inust be one, shall be had here. It is 
proijer, however, that you shouUi know one faci in the 
case, without indicating that we attach much impor- 
tance to it, namely, that, in the capture of Messrs. Ma- 
Bon anil Slidell "on board a British vessel. Captain 
W\\ke>> having acted without any instruct ions from the 

fovernment, the subject is therefore free from the em- 
arrassnient which might have resulted if the act had 
been specially directed by us. I trust thut tlm British 
government u-iU cnn-fider the, .^ulject in trf' iendly temper, 
and it III' tit expect tlie best di.'tpoution on tlve part of this 
govtrnment. 

I submit to the gentleman from Ulster that 



this was all which the principle he himself lays 
down required at the hands of the government. 
It was all the government could do with dignity 
and self-respect, before receiving notice of the 
ground taken by the government of Great Brit- 
ain. At the very outset it disavowed the act, 
expressed the hope and belief that it need not 
interrupt the friendly relations of the two coun- 
tries, and declared its readiness to receive the 
views of Great Britain, and to discuss them in a 
friendly spirit. What more would the gentleman 
from Ulster have had it do 1 What more could it 
have done, without being open to the suspicion of 
an undue eagerness to placate the British power, 
by branding as wrong an act which as an act of 
personal gallantry the whole country admired and 
applauded ? The gentleman concedes that the 
act was wrong, and that we could properly have 
done, before the demand was made, precisely 
what we did afterwards. I put it to him whether 
we could properly or honorably have refused to 
do a just act, simply because it was demanded at 
our hands ? Where is the humiliation of acced- 
ing to a just demand ? Nay, Sir, if we had re- 
fused to do what we recognize as just and right, 
merely because the British government, in due 
form and without a word to which on grounds of 
courtesy just exception could be taken, had 
claimed it at our hands, would not the humilia- 
tion have been tenfold greater 7 Should we not 
have stood degraded and disgraced, at the bar of 
nations, by such a refusal? 

Our government pursued the only course open 
to it on grounds of justice and self-respect. We 
did what was right, because it was right; and we 
have received for so doing the applause of the 
world. We maintained our own cherished princi- 
ples on the subject of neutrality. We secured the 
adhesion to them of every leading power of Eu- 
rope, England herself not excepted. We com- 
manded the respect of the British government 
itself, and proved to it that we were strong 
enough to conquer, not only our enemies, but 
our prejudices and our resentments. Our history 
contains no brighter page than that. No gov- 
ernment ever acted with a clearer devotion to 
the principles of justice and of right. No peo- 
ple on the face of the earth ever exhibited a 
nobler power of self-command, — a more nigh- 
toned devotion to the permanent welfare of the 
country, or a calmer superiority to the excited 
passions of the hour, than did our own on that 



occasion. Posterity will honor them for it, even 
as the united voice of the leading nations of 
the world honoi'S them for it to-day. Permit 
me, sir, to read some of the declarations of for- 
eign powers upon this point. 

First let me call the attention of this com- 
mittee to the language held by M. Thouvenel, 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a des- 
jrTl'jh dated December 3, written in advance of 
the action of our government upon the subject : 

The Trent was not destined to a point belonging to 
one of the belligerents. She was carrying to a neutral 
country her cargo and her pa^^sengers ; and, moreover, 
it WHS in a neutral port that they were taken If it 
were admissible th:it, under such conditions, the neutral 
flitg due.s not completely cover the persons and merchan- 
dise it carries, itsimmuinlj' would be nothiiigmore than 
an idle word ; al any mvTnenl the co77imerce and the 
navigation of third pincers would liave to suffer from 
their" innocent and even their indirect relations with the 
one or the other of the belligerents. Thise last would no 
longer find themselves as having only the right to exact 
from the neutral entire impartiality, and to interdict 
all intermeddling on his part in acts of hostility. They 
Avould impose, on his freedom of commerce and navit;a- 
tion, restrictio;:8 which modern international law has 
refused to admit as legitimate ; ai:d we should, in a 
word, full back upon vexatious pi actices, against which, 
171 other epochs, no power has more earnestly protested 
than the United States. 

If the cabinet of Washington would only look on 
the two persons arrested as rebels, wliom it is always 
lawful to seize, the question, to place it on other ground, 
eou d not be solved, howi-ver, in a sense in favor of the 
commander of the San Jacinto. There would be, in 
6uch case, misapprehension of the princi])le which 
makes a vessel a portion of the territory of the nation 
whose flag it bears, and violation of that immu ity 
which prohibits a foreign sovereign, by conseque.icc, 
from the exercise of his .iurisdiction. // certainly is not 
necessary to recall to mind with what energy, under every 
circumsiance, the government of the United Stales has 
maintained this immunity, and the right of as y turn which 
is the consequence of it. 

Not wishing to enter upon a more deep discussion of 
the questions raised bj the capture of Messrs. Mason 
and Slidell, I have said enough, I think, to settle the 
point that the cabinet of Washintjton could nc.t, icith- 
out striking a blow at the principles which all neutral 
nations are alike intere.st/-d in holding i7i respect, nor 
without taking the, attitude of contradiction of its own 
course up to this time, g'we its approbation to the pro- 
ceedings of the commander of the San Jacinto. In this 
Btate of things it evidently should not, accoraing to our 
views, hesitate about the determination to be taken. 

Lorrl Lyons is already instructed to present the de- 
mand for satisfaction which the English cabinet is 
under the necessity of reducing t*) form, and which con- 
sists in the immed ate release uf the persons taken from 
on board the Trent, aiid in sending explanations which 
may take from this act its offensive character toward 
the British flag Thefederal government will be inspired 
by (I just and exalted feeling in deferring to the^e re- 
questf. One would search in vain to what end, forwliat 
interest, it would hazard to provoke, by a diflerent atti- 
tude, a rupture with Great Britain. 

That, sir, is the voice of France, now one of 
the leading naval, as she has always been one of 
the leading military, powers of Europe ; one, 
moreover, which has always seconded the -^fForts 
of the United States to enlarge? the immunities 
of neutrals in time of war. The voice of Rus- 
sia is equally explicit, and having been uttered 
after our compliance with the just demand of 
Great Britain, is still more pertinent. Let me 



read a single paragraph from the dispatch of 
Prince Gorischakoff, dated Jan. 9, and written 
immediately on receiving intelligence of the ac- 
tion of our government : 

I need not add, Monsieur, that in remaining faithful to 
the political principles which she has always defended, 
even wiien these principles were turned against herselt, 
and in -abstaining from taking advantage, in her turn, of 
doctrines which she had always repudiated^ the Ameri- 
can nation has given a proof of political liunesly icliich 
will acquire for it an inconleslible claim to the esteem 
and gratitude of all governments interested in seeing the 
peace of the seas maintained, and the principles of right 
prevail over force^ in international relations, in the re- 
pose of the icorld, the progress of civilization, and the 
well-being of humanity. 

His majvsty the emperor is pleased to hope that the 
same wisdom and moderation which dictated to the 
Federal government its latest resolutions, will also direct 
its conduct during the continuance of those internal dif- 
ficulties with which it finds itself engatred. 

The emperor is persuaded that the slalesnien who have 
shoicji themselves able to lake such an elevated view of 
the foreign interests of tlieir country, will also knoto how 
to make their internal policy superior to popular passion. 

The government of the new Kingdom of Italy 
holds language equally decided upon the same 
subject, Baron Ricasoli, in a despatch dated 
January 24, after expressing the interest with 
which the government and i)eople of Italy, al- 
though profoundly absorbed in their own affairs, 
have watched the progress of events in the United 
States, addressing the Chevalier Bertinatti, the 
Italian minister at Washington, proceeds to say: 

"You are not Ignorant, Mr. Minister, that the Royal 
Government has always been attached to the })riiiciple9 
of the freedom of the seas. At the Congress of Paris 
it united with eagerness in the declaration of the 30th 
of April, 1856, and hoped that that declaration, as soon 
as it could have the assent of the United States of 
America, would, in time, become the point of departure 
for fresh progress in the practical operation of interna- 
tional law. Knowing the bold and persevc'lng efforts 
whic/iihe Goveriiment al Washington had inadefo^- fifty 
years past, to defend the right of neutrals, we hesitated 
to believe that it desired to change its character all at 
once and become the cliampion of theories which history 
has showji to be calamitous, atid which public opinion 
has condemned forever. 

"By continuing to remain attached to principles 
whose defence has constituted one of the causes of the 
glory of Nortli America, Mr. Lincoln and his Ministry 
liave given an example ofwii^dom and moderation xohicJi 
vyll have the best results for America, as well as for the 
European nations.^'' 

I might quote largely, Sir, from English au- 
thorities to prove how profoundly this act of 
justice has impressed even the English people 
with respect for the wisdom and moderation 
which have marked the conduct of the President 
and Cabinet at Washington in this affair. Hav- 
ing some regard left, however, for the patience 
of the Committee, I shall content myself with 
this single paragraph from a recent number of 
Frazer's Magazine — a periodical of acknowledged 
position and influence : — 

" I contend that all previous cause of oftence should 
be considered as cancelled by the reparation which the 
American Government has so amply u.ade ; not so much 



the reparation itself, which might have heen so made as 
to leave still greater cause of permanent resentment be- 
hind it, but the manner and spirit in which they have 
made it. These have been such as most of us, I ven- 
ture to say, did not by any means expect. If reparation 
were made at all, of which few us telt more than a 
hope, we thought that it would have been made obvi- 
ously as a concession to prudence, not to principle. We 
expected that the atonement, if atonement there were, 
would have been made with reservations, perhaps under 
protest We expected that the correspondence would 
have been spun out, and a trial made to induce England 
to be satisfied with less ; or that there would have been 
a proposal of arbitration ; or that E' gland would have 
been asked to make concessions in return for justice ; or 
that if submission was made, it would have been made, 
ostensibly, to the opinions and wishes of Continenlal 
Europe. We expected anMhing, in short, which would 
have been weak, and timid, and paltry The only thing 
which no one seemed to expect is what has actually hap- 
pened. Mr. Lincoln's Government has done none of 
these things. Like honest meii, tliey have said in direct 
terms that our demand is right ; that they yielded to it 
because it was just ; that if they themselves had received 
the same treatmenl they would have demanded the same 
reparation ; and that if what seemed to he the American 
side of a question was not the just side., they would he on 
the side of justice ; happy as they were to find, after 
their resolution had heen taken, that it was also the side 
which America had formerly defended. Is thcfre aiiy one, 
capable of a moral judgnient or feeling, who will say 
that his opinion of America and American stetesman is 
not raised by such an act, done on such grounds 7 The 
act iueli may have been in po^■ed by the necessity of 
the circumstances, but the reasons given, the princi- 
ples of action professed, Avere their own choice. 

Are not these tributes worth something to us ? 
Have we not gained something of permanent 
and substantial value, when we have thus 
secured the respect and esteem of all the lead- 
ing powers of Christendom ? Can there have 
been anything " liumiliating " in an act which 
thus commands the unqualified and hearty ap- 
plause of every great Christian nation? I ask 
my friend from Ulster, whether our position to- 
day on this subject is not infinitely better, in 
every respect, — on the score of national dignity, 
of national honor and of national interest, — 
than it would have been if we had yielded to 
the sentiment which he invokes, and refused, 
from a feeling of false pride, to make reparation 
for an acknowledged wrong, merely because it 
was demanded by a government which had 
earned no claim to courtesies at our hands ? 

One word, now, in regard to another of the 
instances in which our government is said to 
have been humiliated in its relations with Great 
Brilian, — I speak of the permission given to 
march British troops, on their way to Canada, 
across the State of Maine. " This," says the 
gentleman from Ulster, " is in a spirit of meek- 
ness and humility that seldom characterises a 
people conscious of their abilities to maintain 
heir rights and their dignity. Some gentlemen 
may characterise it as the law of kindness : I 
chooie to characterise it as emantiting from a seme cf 
weakness y 



I cannot concur in this view of the mat- 
ter. Instead of emanating from a sense of 
weakness, sir, it seems to me to have in- 
dicate^ a consciousness of strength. We were 
strong enough to afford such an act of cour- 
tesy. If we had felt weak, distrustful of the 
designs of England, or of our own ability 
to meet them, we might have shrunk from such 
an act. But we had no such feeling. We were 
on terms of amity with Great Britain. She had 
disavowed any thought or purpose of hostility 
in sending troops to Canada. It was a happy 
inspiration which led the President or the Secre- 
tary of State to show England, by such a prof- 
ferred courtesy, that we neither dreaded her 
power nor distrusted her friendship. It was a 
small favor: all it could possibly accomplish 
was to enable the troops to reach Canada some 
five days sooner, and with somewhat less of ex- 
posure and hardship, than they could otherwise 
have done. But it is with nations as in private life 
— small acts of kindness often go further than 
great acts to indicate a friendly temper — to dis- 
arm jealousies and conquer the prejudices and 
suspicions which implant needless distrust be- 
tween neighbors and nations. '' Magnanimity 
in politics," says Burke, " is not seldom the 
truest wisdom, and a great empire and little 
minds go but ill together." I honor the govern- 
ment for its action in that aflTair. The State of 
Maine has expressed her hearty approval of it. 
Tho country and the world have seen in it an indi- 
cation of conscious strength and of superiority to 
the petty jealousies and resentments of the hour. 

Now, Sir, a word concerning the inquiries of 
England concerning the stone blockade. We 
have always insisted that a blockade, to be re- 
spected, must be effective. We protested against 
the course of England, when during the great war 
with France she attempted to blockade the en- 
tire French coast by proclamations and by Orders 
in Council as we also protested against the at- 
tempt of Napoleon to retaliate by forbidding all 
netttral trade with England in the Berlin and 
Milan decrees. We have insisted that every 
blockade must be actual ; and we have assumed 
the obligation of making our blockade of the 
Southern ports actual and effective, as the only 
condition on which we can demand that it shall 
be respected. In the prosecution of this purpose * 
we have sunk stone boats at the mouth of 
Charleston harbor. Great Britain having, like 



every other commercial natioD, an interest in 
every harbor of the world, asked the object of 
that transaction. I think she had a right to do 
so 5 for harbors, in a very important sense, be- 
long to no one nation as a pccuUum — a private 
and exclusive possession. They are the gift of 
God to the commerce of the world. They are 
intended to promote that intercourse of nations 
by which the civilization of the world is carried 
forward; and I think it very doubtful whether 
any nation, judged by the highest standards of. 
international morality, has a right to destroy a 
harbor except under pressure of the direst 
necessity. At all events, sir, Great Britain had 
an undoubted right to inquire of our govern- 
ment with what object that stone fleet had been 
sunk at the mouth of Charleston harbor. Noth- 
ing is more common or more proper than such 
requests for explanation. It does not appear 
that any complaint was made. Lord Lyons 
informs his government that he had " spoken to 
Mr. Seward on the subject," and that Mr. Sew- 
A.RD observed "that the plan had not been devised 
fvith a view to injure the harbor permanently ; 
t was simply a temporary military measure to 
lid the blockade." That certainly was a very 
proper reply. I can see nothing in it of the 
* frittering admissions and humiliating conces- 
sions," which the gentleman from Ulster detects. 
\lr. Seward added that as had already been 
lone at Port Royal the United States would open 
)etter harbors than they had closed. And 
erious exception is taken by my friend from 
vlinton (Mr. Stetson), to the remark of Lord 
yons in reply, that " the opening of a new port 
hirty or forty miles off would hardly console the 
teople of Charleston for the destruction of their 
wn harbor." I do not see that the remark was 
ither very pertinent or very important. Lord 
YONS was probably aware that it was no part of 
he object of our government just now to " con- 
ole the people of Charleston" for any of the 
vils incident to the rebellion in which they are 



Mr. Stetson : I only intended to say that this 
mark of Lord Lyons revealed the secret sym- 
athy of the English with the rebels. 
Mr. Raymond : Possibly it may have indicated 
le personal sympathy of Lord Lyons with the 
pople of Charleston. I do not think it can 
.irl}'- be held to warrant any broader or more 
nportant inference. Certainly it is not st'mat- 



.2.2.2- 

ter to warrant hostile preparations or inspire 
fears or thoughts of war. 

Mr. Pierce : Do you admit the right of Great 
Britain to catechise us as to our own proceedings 
in regard to our own ports 1 

Mr. Raymond : I admit her right to ask expla- 
nations in a friendly way of any act on our part, 
concerning which there is fair room for doubt, 
and which may affect her interests hereafter. I 
think she had precisely the same right to ask 
the intent and meaning of our sinking a stone 
fleet at the mouth of Charleston harbor, as we 
had to ask the object of her sending troops to 
Canada. 

Mr. Pierce. — Does the gentleman mean to say 
that this is all that was intended by that letter of 
Lord Lyons? 

Mr. Raymond. — I detect nothing else in it. I 
can see nothing in it beyond a common place, 
friendly call for explanations of a point concern- 
ing which there was room for doubt, and in which 
Great Britain had an important and a permanent 
interest. 

Upon all these points, therefore, in the settle- 
ment of the Trent affair, in proffering permission 
for the passage of Britisli troops across the State 
of Maine, and in the explanations asked and 
frankly given concerning the stone blockade, I 
see nothing whatever to warrant the statement 
of the gentleman from Ulster, that our govern- 
ment had been humiliated and disgraced. On 
the contrary, Sir, I hold that its honor has been 
rigidly and scrupulously guarded and maintained 
and that its highest and most enduring interests 
have been consulted, in everything that has been 
done by our government in these affairs. 

Permit mo here. Sir, to say, that in my humble 
judgment this State, this Nation and the world 
at large owe to the Secretary of State a debt of 
gratitude for his management of our foreign rela- 
tions in this the most difficult crisis of our affairs 
He has maintained our rights ; he has protect- 
ed our honor; he has secured our interests; 
he has preserved the peace of the world; he 
has brought to the discharge of the dutips of 
his great office a degree of ability, a far-seeing 
statesmanship, a high-toned sense of what is 
just and right, and a paramount, exclusive 
devotion to the good of the country, seldom 
if ever surpassed in the history of any nation. 
New York has many names upon the records of 
the nation of which she may well be proud. 



^^ir 



PVom the earliest period of our history to the 
present day, they illustrate that chapter which 
she contributes to our national history. Hamil- 
to!), Jay. Ciintoii, Tompkins, Marcy, Wright, — 
these are all names which make the State re- 
no'viifd; and among the best and brightest of 
them ^W.primua inter pares, future time will en- 
r '\, for b.is guidance of our ship of state under 
the tempests that now assail it, as well as for the 
general service he has rendered the country 
during a long public career unstained by re- 
pro:u;'i and marked by the m^st brilliant deeds, 
the name of William H. Seward [applause]. 
I say this, Sir, with the more freedom now be- 
cause, by his own act, his name is henceforth 
removed entirely from the field of political con- 
troversy, 

I have finished what I had to say of the causes 
which are supposed to render doubtful, at least 
uncertain, the continuance of our peaceful rela- 
tions with Great Britain. I have examined each 
count in the indictment with more of detail, 
perhMpg. than was necessary, — certainly with a 
more serious draft than I could have *vished 
upon the patience of the committee. And what 
is there left,! What remains of all the grounds 
allested for apprehended war? Nothing, Sir,— no- 
thing whatever beyond the au'iry recriminations 
of the newspaper press, and the general distrust 
and uneasy jietulance of a large and noisy por- 
tion of the people of both countries. I would not 
underrate the importance and influence even of 
these indications. They charg^e the atmosphere 
with elements of danger. They lay the foundation 
for future trouble doubtless, by rendering more 
difficult the peaceful solution of controversies 
that may arise between the tvvo nations. But 
Ihey only thus make a little more difficult the 
task of state.-manshi[) ; they do not by any 
nipans render it impossible. It is for men in 
))ublic place to allay these angry discontents 
that have no ju>t foundation. — not to increase 
them. It is the duty of men charged with the 
conduct of jmblic alhii s, or ])laced in positions 
of public influence, to smooth all these asperi- 
ties, to calm these resentments, and to bring the 
public mind to consult only what is jus-t and 
right and befitting the character and the welfare 
of a great nation. 

I have If^ft myself but little time to speak of 
the sul'j-'ct referred to by the gentleman from 
Yates [Mr. Ogpen] the interference of Spain, 
Fra:^ce ad Eng'an 1, i'> the nff.iirs of Mexico ; and 
yt-t I cannot pass ii who'.ly without notice. It is by 



no means free from difficulty or from danger to 
the public peace. I cannot help thinking that 
we have ourselves, in very great degree, to blame 
for having lost control of its management and 
direction. Mexico invited us some years ago to 
exercise a quasi protectorate over her ; and in 
the treaty which she concluded with Mr. McLanb 
tendered to us a degree of influence which 
would have saved her and us from the compli- 
cations which threaten both. We rejected the 
offer. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty. 
Mexico was allowed to drift on into increasing 
anarchy, and to commit, for lack of steady con- 
trol and timely aid to the government which 
would have exercised it, those outrages and in- 
discretions which have brought upon her the 
intervention of foreign powers. 

Those powers, it is but just to remember, 
have been impelled by different motives in 
the action they have taken. Spain's motive 
is, beyond all doubt, ambition — the ambition 
10 fig-.ire again as a first rate power and possi- 
bly to regain some of her old possessions. 
But France and England had substantial wrongs 
to redress — outrages upon their subjects to pun- 
i;:<h, and security for their interests to gain here- 
after. That they will ever agree in the policy of 
forcing Maxijiiliax, or any other foreign prince 
upon the throne of Mexico, I very greatly doubt. 
That project seems to have been concocted, not 
in either of the three countries concerned, nor 
even in Austria. So far as we can get any relia- 
l)le evidence of its origin, it seems to have been 
one of the mr.ny intrigues by which the expelled 
pgents and emissaries in Europe of the defeated 
Church and Monarchical party in Mexico, s'jek 
to regain power and drive the liberals from office. 
This seems highly probable in the first place 
from the correspondence which has passed be- 
tween the English and French governments 
upon the subject. As soon as the scheme was 
broached in the European journals, Earl Cowley, 
under date of January 24, wrote to the English 

Minister, as follows : 

Paris, Jan. 24, 1862. 

I bfive heard from po many quarters that the language 
of officers soiiig with the reinforcements to Mexico is 
that it is for the purpose of phicing the Archduke Maxi 
niiliaii upon the throne of that country, that I havoj 
thiMii/litit necessary to question M. Thouvencl upon th 
euli.ject. . , ^. _ 

I inquired of M. Thouvenel whether any negotiation 
had t)Hen pcndinir between the government and that o; 
Austria, witli roA-rence to the Archduke Maximilian. 
H.s excellency replied in the negative. lie said that ih« 
ve.gotiatu-nH kitd heen carried on hy MeicicanK only, wJur: 
had come over for tkepurpose and gone to Vienna, 

The English government lost no time in warn- 
ing the parlies concerned against the prosecutiox 



of such a purpose. In a letter dated January 
19th, Earl Russsll directed the British Minister, 
at Madrid, to make suitable representations to the 
Spanish government upon the subject. I quote 
a paragraph from that despatch : 

I wish you to read to Marshall O'Donncll and M. Calde- 
ron ColUintes the preamble and the article of our con- 
vention, which define what our intervention ia intended 
to do and what it is not intended to do. 

You iviU point out that the nil Led forcefi are not to he 
used for the pwpose of depriving the Mexicans of their 
undoubted right of choosing their own jorm of govern- 
ment. 

Shoidd the Mexicans choose to constitute anew govern- 
ment^ which can restore order and preserve amicable rela- 
tions williforeign nations, her Majesty's government loifl 
be delighted to liail the torniation, and to (^ujiport the con- 
solulaiion of such a eovernnient. If, on the contrfiry, 
the troops of foreign Powers are to be tised to set up a 
governmenl repugnant to the sentiments of Mexico., and 
to support it by military force, her Majesty's government 
could expect no other result from such an attempt than 
discord aiid disappointment. In such a case the allied 
governments could only liave to choose hetween with- 
draw! iiir from sucn an enterprise with some shame, or 
extending their interference beyond the limits, scope 
and intention cf the triple convention. 

And in a despatch, dated January 27, Earl 

Russell thus writes to Sir C. Wyke, the British 

Minister in Mexico, on the same point : — 

It is said that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian 
■will be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place 
himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican 
people will gladly hail such a change. 

I have little to add to my former instructions on this 
head. If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous move- 
m,e7it, y)lHCC the Austrian Archduke on the throne of 
Mexico there ia nothing in the convention to prevent it, 

" On the other hand, we wauld be no parties to a forci- 
ble intervention for this purpose. The Mexicans must 
consult their own interests " 

This language leaves little room to doubt that 
England does not intend to become a party to 
any scheme for forcing a monarchical form of 
government upon the people of Mexico, or for 
placing any European prince at the head of its 
government. Most assuredly, in my judgment, 
she will not engage in any Pl^ch intrigue if she 
thereby incurs one chance in a hundred, to use 
the language of my friend from Ulster, of war 
with the United States. 

There are indications also that the Emperor 
of the French will take the same ground. A 
letter from the Paris correspondent of the New 
York Times, whom I know personally to be 
ikely, from his position and character, to be 
well informed on such a subject, states that so 
'ar as the Emperor has lent his encouragement 
,0 the scheme at all, it has been in consequence 
3f the misrepresentations of the Mexican emissa- 
ries already referred to. I read a single sentence 
From his letter, which I find in the Times of this 
morning : 

These misrepresentations of the Mexican monarch i- 
)al agents have Led the French Government into an er , 



ror. and, there is reason to believe, have disgusted them 
with the whole enterprise. When the rtr.-i e\pedilioa 
started, it was l)elievcd that the Monarchical Party, 
headed by Almonte and Mira.mon, was" so powerful 
that the combined forces had but to show themselves, 
and the thing would be decided without striking a 
blow. Subsequent intelligence, obtained principally 
from M- Mercier, at Wa.shnigton, disabused the mind 
of the Emperor on this head, but he was then so far 
engaged in the atfair that he was obliged to carry it 
hrough, cost what it may. It was then that he or- 
dered forward the late large reinforcements, and gave 
orders for a reserve force which will follow, if re- 
quired. The unanimity with which the Mexicans are 
uniting to defend their country from foreign invasion, 
did not create astonishment in England, but it did in 
France. The Emperor in now reduced to his first 
programme, that of seeking the money that is due 
to France, leaving the monarcJucal progjammeto luks 
lurre o itsft/. 

These blunders have naturally produced di^satisfao- 
tion in France, and make the people and the Govern' 
ment icixh they were well out of the enterprise. Th« 
occasion is a guod one fur the mediation of the Goveni' 
ment of the United States. 

This last paragraph hints at what may, after 
all, be the solution of the whole affair. At all 
events, the project does not seem to me to in- 
volve any special danger to the honor or interests 
of the United States. It seems altogether prob- 
able that if seriously pushed it will dissolve the 
coalition. Certainly it can not, upon any ordi- 
nary estimate of chances, be regarded as likely 
to involve us in war. 

One word more, sir, and I will relieve the pa- 
tience of the committee. The gentleman from 
Ulster (Mr. Pierce), wished to know whether 
we had asked ourselves the question, what is to 
become of the six hundred thousand men now 
in arms in behalf of the Union, after the Union 
is established and the insurrection is ended 7 
Are they, said he, to return to the plow and the 
anvil, to the workshop and the factory, and set- 
tle down there again quiet and contented ? He 
feared they would not, and that we should have 
here the material which we should find it neces- 
sary to employ in redressing the wrongs we have 
sustained from foreign powers. Even if this 
were all true, I do not see, sir, that it affords anj 
reason why New York should appropriate five 
millions of dollars to arm herself in instant 
preparation for a foreign vi ar. But let me re- 
mind the gentleman of some considerations 
which it is desirable not to lose sight of in this 
connection. Our armies are not made up, lik« 
the standing armies of Europe, of mercenaries 
who make their living by war, and who neod 
this employment to keep them from starvation. 
They are men who have left their ordinary avo- 
cations to deliver their country from a tempo- 
rary peril. Two-thirds of them have homes and 
occupations, wives and children, or parents and 



friends.^ They have roof-trees and hearth-stones, 
to which their hearts turn with loving affection, 
even amid the exciting clamors of the camp. 
When they shall be released from the service of 
their country, the great mass of them will 
return to the pursuits of peace, and love them 
all the more for their brief absence from them. 
Not all our troops, I admit, are of this stamp. 
There will be scores and perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of them who are soldiers for the sake 
of adventure and who will miss the excitement 
which makes the camp attractive. But are these 
men to control the policy and decide the fate of 
the nation 1 Are we to shape our public action 
to the supposed necessities of such men ? Cer- 
tainly not. They will find ample fields for their 
adventurous disposition without plunging the 
country into foreign wars for its gratification. 
Thousands of them will remain in the section 
they are now invading and devote their energies 
to reclaiming its soil, to reinvigorating its indus- 
try, to modifying its institutions, and giving to it 
a new face and a nobler fate. Those for whom 
such pursuits shall be too tame, will drift off 
still further southward, into Mexico or South 
America, where the condition of society is better 
suited to their wants, and where they will find 
abundant means to gratify their love of adven- 
ture. 

We may have disturbances and difficulties, 
more or less serious, from this source. We shall 
need wisdom and calm sagacity on the part of 
our public rulers, to enable us to deal wisely 
with such tempers. We shall need in our public 
councils men who seek place only that they may 



therein serve the country — not men who seek it 
for selfish ends, by flattery of public passions 
and by pandering to the base and ignoble aims , 
of vulgar men. But with such men in power, 
(and the temper of the times is favorable to their 
selection), I apprehend no serious difficulty in 
dealing with the apprehended evil to which my 
friend alludes. Doubtless there is danger, more 
or less menacing, from the predominance of the 
military temper and spirit which war evokes — 
and one of my strongest objections to this bill is, 
that it encourages that spirit, and addresses itself 
to the popular feeling which it creates. 

For these reasons, sir — and I thank the commit- 
tee for the patience with which they have heard 
me state them — I oppose the passage of this bill 
" providing for the public defence." I know of no 
emergency that calls for its enactment. I know 
of no impending danger that calls upon this 
state to expend five millions of dollars in forts 
and guns and munitions of war, and in adding 
thus largely to the burdens which the war-tax 
will impose upon her people. I do not believe 
all taxation to be an evil. When properly dis- 
tributed and wisely applied, like the moisture 
which ascends from the earth only to fall again 
with blessing upon its bosom, it improves and 
stimulates to still higher productiveness the very 
sources from which it is dr^wn. But taxation 
which dries up the very sources of revenue be- 
comes a heavy and a fatal curse. Let us not bt 
impatient to outrun the necessities of the time, 
nor eager to trespass, without some imperative 
necessity, upon the functions and prerogatives 
of the General Government. 



4 




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i^l 



